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Our scientific field is still in its embryonic stage. It's great that  
we haven't been around for two thousands years. We are still at  
a stage where very, very important results occur in front of our eyes 
Michael Rabin 
1. Introduction  
Today there is virtually no area where information technology (ІТ) is not used in some way. 
Computers support banking systems, control the work of nuclear power plants, and control 
aircraft, satellites and spacecraft. The high level of automation therefore depends on the 
security level of IT.  
The main features of information security are confidentiality, integrity and availability. Only 
providing these all gives availability for development secure telecommunication systems. 
Confidentiality is the basic feature of information security, which ensures that information is 
accessible only to authorized users who have an access. Integrity is the basic feature of 
information security indicating its property to resist unauthorized modification. Availability 
is the basic feature of information security that indicates accessible and usable upon demand 
by an authorized entity. 
One of the most effective ways to ensure confidentiality and data integrity during 
transmission is cryptographic systems. The purpose of such systems is to provide key 
distribution, authentication, legitimate users authorisation, and encryption. Key distribution 
is one of the most important problems of cryptography. This problem can be solved with the help 
of (SECOQC White Paper on Quantum Key Distribution and Cryptography, 2007; 
Korchenko et al., 2010a): 
• Classical information-theoretic schemes (requires channel with noise; efficiency is very low, 
1–5%). 
• Classical public-key cryptography schemes (Diffie-Hellman scheme, digital envelope 
scheme; it has computational security). 
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• Classical computationally secure symmetric-key cryptographic schemes (requires a pre-
installed key on both sides and can be used only as scheme for increase in key size but 
not as key distribution scheme). 
• Quantum key distribution (provides information-theoretic security; it can also be used as 
a scheme for increase in key length). 
• Trusted Couriers Key Distribution (it has a high price and is dependent on the human 
factor). 
In recent years, quantum cryptography (QC) has attracted considerable interest. Quantum 
key distribution (QKD) (Bennett, 1992; Bennett et al., 1992; Bennett et al., 1995; Bennett & 
Brassard, 1984; Bouwmeester et al., 2000; Gisin et al., 2002; Lütkenhaus & Shields, 2009; 
Scarani et al., 2009; Vasiliu & Vorobiyenko 2006; Williams, 2011) plays a dominant role in 
QC. The overwhelming majority of theoretic and practical research projects in QC are 
related to the development of QKD protocols. The number of different quantum 
technologies is increasing, but there is no comprehensive information about classification of 
these technologies in scientific literature (there are only a few works concerning different 
classifications of QKD protocols, for example (Gisin et al., 2002; Scarani, et al., 2009)). This 
makes it difficult to estimate the level of the latest achievements and does not allow using 
quantum technologies with full efficiency. The main purpose of this chapter is the 
systematisation and classification of up-to-date effective quantum technologies of data 
(transmitted via telecommunication channels) security, analysis of their strengths and 
weaknesses, prospects and difficulties of implementation in telecommunication systems.  
The first of all quantum technologies of information security consist of (Korchenko et al., 2010b): 
• Quantum key distribution.  
• Quantum secure direct communication. 
• Quantum steganography. 
• Quantum secret sharing. 
• Quantum stream cipher. 
• Quantum digital signature, etc. 
The theoretical basis of quantum cryptography is stated in set of books and review papers 
(see e.g. Bouwmeester et al., 2000; Gisin et al., 2002; Hayashi, 2006; Imre & Balazs, 2005; 
Kollmitzer & Pivk, 2010; Lomonaco, 1998; Nielsen & Chuang, 2000; Schumacher & 
Westmoreland, 2010; Vedral, 2006; Williams, 2011).  
2. Main approaches to quantum secure telecommunication systems 
construction 
2.1 Quantum key distribution 
QKD includes the following protocols: protocols using single (non-entangled) qubits 
(two-level quantum systems) and qudits (d-level quantum systems, d>2) (Bennett, 1992; 
Bennett et al., 1992; Bourennane et al., 2002; Bruss & Macchiavello, 2002; Cerf et al., 2002; 
Gnatyuk et al., 2009); protocols using phase coding (Bennett, 1992); protocols using 
entangled states (Ekert, 1991; Durt et al., 2004); decoy states protocols (Brassard et al., 
2000; Liu et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2007; Yin et al., 2008; Zhao et al., 2006a, 2006b); and some 
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other protocols (Bradler, 2005; Lütkenhaus & Shields, 2009; Navascués & Acín, 2005; 
Pirandola et al., 2008). 
The main task of QKD protocols is encryption key generation and distribution between two 
users connecting via quantum and classical channels (Gisin et al., 2002). In 1984 Ch. Bennett 
from IBM and G. Brassard from Montreal University introduced the first QKD protocol 
(Bennett & Brassard, 1984), which has become an alternative solution for the problem of key 
distribution. This protocol is called BB84 (Bouwmeester et al., 2000) and it refers to QKD 
protocols using single qubits. The states of these qubits are the polarisation states of single 
photons. The BB84 protocol uses four polarisation states of photons (0°, 45°, 90°, 135°). These 
states refer to two mutually unbiased bases. Error searching and correcting is performed 
using classical public channel, which need not be confidential but only authenticated. For 
the detection of intruder actions in the BB84 protocol, an error control procedure is used, 
and for providing unconditionally security a privacy amplification procedure is used 
(Bennett et al., 1995). The efficiency of the BB84 protocol equals 50%. Efficiency means the 
ratio of the photons number which are used for key generation to the general number of 
transmitted photons.  
Six-state protocol requires the usage of four states, which are the same as in the BB84 
protocol, and two additional directions of polarization: right circular and left circular (Bruss, 
1998). Such changes decrease the amount of information, which can be intercepted. But on 
the other hand, the efficiency of the protocol decreases to 33%.  
Next, the 4+2 protocol is intermediate between the BB84 and B92 protocol (Huttner et al., 
1995). There are four different states used in this protocol for encryption: “0” and “1” in two 
bases. States in each base are selected non-orthogonal. Moreover, states in different bases 
must also be pairwise non-orthogonal. This protocol has a higher information security level 
than the BB84 protocol, when weak coherent pulses, but not a single photon source, are used 
by sender (Huttner et al., 1995). But the efficiency of the 4+2 protocol is lower than efficiency 
of BB84 protocol.  
In the Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol (Goldenberg & Vaidman, 1995), encryption of “0” and “1” 
is performed using two orthogonal states. Each of these two states is the superposition of 
two localised normalised wave packets. For protection against intercept-resend attack, 
packets are sent at random times.  
A modified type of Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol is called the Koashi-Imoto protocol (Koashi 
& Imoto, 1997). This protocol does not use a random time for sending packets, but it uses an 
interferometer’s non-symmetrisation (the light is broken in equal proportions between both 
long and short interferometer arms).  
The measure of QKD protocol security is Shannon’s mutual information between legitimate 
users (Alice and Bob) and an eavesdropper (Eve): ( )AEI D  and ( )BEI D , where D is error 
level which is created by eavesdropping. For most attacks on QKD protocols, 
( ) ( )AE BEI D I D= , we will therefore use ( )AEI D . The lower ( )AEI D  in the extended range of 
D is, the more secure the protocol is. 
Six-state protocol and BB84 protocol were generalised in case of using d-level quantum 
systems — qudits instead qubits (Cerf et al., 2002). This allows increasing the information 
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capacity of protocols. We can transfer information using d-level quantum systems (which 
correspond to the usage of trits, quarts, etc.). It is important to notice that QKD protocols are 
intended for classical information (key) transfer via quantum channel.  
The generalisation of BB84 protocol for qudits is called protocol using single qudits and two 
bases due to use of two mutually unbiased bases for the eavesdropping detection. Similarly, 
the generalisation of six-state protocol is called protocol using qudits and d+1 bases. These 
protocols’ security against intercept-resend attack and non-coherent attack was investigated 
in a number of articles (see e.g. Cerf et al., 2002). Vasiliu & Mamedov have carried out a 
comparative analysis of the efficiency and security of different protocols using qudits on the 
basis of known formulas for mutual information (Vasiliu & Mamedov, 2008). 
In fig. 1 dependences of ( )ABI D , ( ) ( )1dAEI D+  and ( ) ( )2AEI D  are presented, where ( )ABI D  is 
mutual information between Alice and Bob and ( ) ( )1dAEI D+  and ( ) ( )2AEI D  is mutual 
information between Alice and Eve for protocols using d+1 and two bases accordingly. 
 
 
a) b) 
Fig. 1. Mutual information for non-coherent attack. 1, 2, 3 — ( )ABI D  for d = 2, 4, 8 (а) and  
d = 16, 32, 64 (b); 4, 5, 6— ( ) ( )1dAEI D+  for d = 2, 4, 8 (а) and d = 16, 32, 64 (b); 7, 8, 9— ( ) ( )2AEI D  
for d = 2, 4, 8 (а) and d = 16, 32, 64 (b).  
In fig. 1 we can see that at low qudit dimension (up to d ~ 16) the protocol’s security against 
non-coherent attack is higher when d+1 bases are used (when d = 2 it corresponds as noted 
above to greater security of six-state protocol than BB84 protocol). But the protocol’s security 
is higher when two bases are used in the case of large d, while the difference in Eve’s 
information (using d+1 or two bases) is not large in the work region of the protocol, i.e. in 
the region of Alice’s and Bob’s low error level. That’s why that the number of bases used has 
little influence on the security of the protocol against non-coherent attack (at least for the 
qudit dimension up to d = 64). The crossing points of curves ( )ABI D  and ( )AEI D  
correspond to boundary values D, up to which one’s legitimate users can establish a secret 
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key by means of a privacy amplification procedure (even when eavesdropping occurs) 
(Bennett et al., 1995). 
It is shown (Vasiliu & Mamedov, 2008) that the security of a protocol with qudits using two 
bases against intercept-resend attack is practically equal to the security of this protocol 
against non-coherent attack at any d. At the same time, the security of the protocol using d+1 
bases against this attack is much higher. Intercept-resend attack is the weakest of all possible 
attacks on QKD protocols, but on the other hand, the efficiency of the protocol using d+1 
bases rapidly decreases as d increases. A protocol with qudits using two bases therefore has 
higher security and efficiency than a protocol using d+1 bases. 
Another type of QKD protocol is a protocol using phase coding: for example, the B92 protocol 
(Bennett, 1992) using strong reference pulses (Gisin et al., 2002). An eavesdropper can 
obtain more information about the encryption key in the B92 protocol than in the BB84 
protocol for the given error level, however. Thus, the security of the B92 protocol is lower 
than the security of the BB84 protocol (Fuchs et al., 1997). The efficiency of the B92 
protocol is 25%.  
The Ekert protocol (E91) (Ekert, 1991) refers to QKD protocols using entangled states. 
Entangled pairs of qubits that are in a singlet state ( )1 2 0 1 1 0ψ − = −  are used in 
this protocol. Qubit interception between Alice to Bob does not give Eve any information 
because no coded information is there. Information appears only after legitimate users make 
measurements and communicate via classical public authenticated channel (Ekert, 1991). 
But attacks with additional quantum systems (ancillas) are nevertheless possible on this 
protocol (Inamori et al., 2001). 
Kaszlikowski et al. carried out the generalisation of the Ekert scheme for three-level 
quantum systems (Kaszlikowski et al., 2003) and Durt et al. carried out the generalisation of 
the Ekert scheme for d-level quantum systems (Durt et al., 2004): this increases the 
information capacity of the protocol a lot. Also the security of the protocol using entangled 
qudits is investigated (Durt et al., 2004). In the paper (Vasiliu & Mamedov, 2008), based on 
the results of (Durt et al., 2004), the security comparison of protocol using entangled qudits 
and protocols using single qudits (Cerf et al., 2002) against non-coherent attack is made. It 
was found that the security of these two kinds of protocols is almost identical. But the 
efficiency of the protocol using entangled qudits increases more slowly with the increasing 
dimension of qudits than the efficiency of the protocol using single qudits and two bases. 
Thus, from all contemporary QKD protocols using qudits, the most effective and secure 
against non-coherent attack is the protocol using single qudits and two bases (BB84 for 
qubits).  
The aforementioned protocols with qubits are vulnerable to photon number splitting attack. 
This attack cannot be applied when the photon source emits exactly one photon. But there 
are still no such photon sources. Therefore, sources with Poisson distribution of photon 
number are used in practice. The part of pulses of this source has more than one photon. 
That is why Eve can intercept one photon from pulse (which contains two or more photons) 
and store it in quantum memory until Alice transfers Bob the sequence of bases used. Then 
Eve can measure stored states in correct basis and get the cryptographic key while 
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remaining invisible. It should be noted that there are more advanced strategies of photon 
number splitting attack which allow Bob to get the correct statistics of the photon number in 
pulses if Bob is controlling these statistics (Lutkenhaus & Jahma, 2002).  
In practice for realisation of BB84 and six-state protocols weak coherent pulses with average 
photon number about 0,1 are used. This allows avoiding small probability of two- and 
multi-photon pulses, but this also considerably reduces the key rate.  
The SARG04 protocol does not differ much from the original BB84 protocol (Branciard et al., 
2005; Scarani et al., 2004; Scarani et al., 2009). The main difference does not refer to the 
“quantum“ part of the protocol; it refers to the “classical” procedure of key sifting, which 
goes after quantum transfer. Such improvement allows increasing security against photon 
number splitting attack. The SARG04 protocol in practice has a higher key rate than the 
BB84 protocol (Branciard et al., 2005).  
Another way of protecting against photon number splitting attack is the use of decoy states 
QKD protocols (Brassard et al., 2000; Peng et al., 2007; Rosenberg et al., 2007; Zhao et al., 
2006), which are also advanced types of BB84 protocol. In such protocols, besides 
information signals Alice’s source also emits additional pulses (decoys) in which the average 
photon number differs from the average photon number in the information signal. Eve’s 
attack will modify the statistical characteristics of the decoy states and/or signal state and 
will be detected. As practical experiments have shown for these protocols (as for the 
SARG04 protocol), the key rate and practical length of the channel is bigger than for BB84 
protocols (Peng et al., 2007; Rosenberg et al., 2007; Zhao et al., 2006). Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to notice that using these protocols, as well as the others considered above, it is 
also impossible without users pre-authentication to construct the complete high-grade 
solution of the problem of key distribution. 
As a conclusion, after the analysis of the first and scale quantum method, we must sum up 
and highlight the following advantages of QKD protocols:  
1. These protocols always allow eavesdropping to be detected because Eve’s connection 
brings much more error level (compared with natural error level) to the quantum 
channel. The laws of quantum mechanics allow eavesdropping to be detected and the 
dependence between error level and intercepted information to be set. This allows 
applying privacy amplification procedure, which decreases the quantity of information 
about the key, which can be intercepted by Eve. Thus, QKD protocols have 
unconditional (information-theoretic) security.  
2. The information-theoretic security of QKD allows using an absolutely secret key for 
further encryption using well-known classical symmetrical algorithms. Thus, the 
entire information security level increases. It is also possible to synthesize QKD 
protocols with Vernam cipher (one-time pad) which in complex with unconditionally 
secured authenticated schemes gives a totally secured system for transferring 
information.  
The disadvantages of quantum key distribution protocols are:  
1. A system based only on QKD protocols cannot serve as a complete solution for key 
distribution in open networks (additional tools for authentication are needed). 
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2. The limitation of quantum channel length which is caused by the fact that there is no 
possibility of amplification without quantum properties being lost. However, the 
technology of quantum repeaters could overcome this limitation in the near future 
(Sangouard et al., 2011). 
3. Need for using weak coherent pulses instead of single photon pulses. This decreases the 
efficiency of protocol in practice. But this technology limitation might be defeated in the 
nearest future. 
4. The data transfer rate decreases rapidly with the increase in the channel length.  
5. Photon registration problem which leads to key rate decreasing in practice. 
6. Photon depolarization in the quantum channel. This leads to errors during data 
transfer. Now the typical error level equals a few percent, which is much greater than 
the error level in classical telecommunication systems. 
7. Difficulty of the practical realisation of QKD protocols for d-level quantum systems.  
8. The high price of commercial QKD systems.  
2.2 Quantum secure direct communication 
The next method of information security based on quantum technologies is the usage of 
quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocols (Boström & Felbinger, 2002; Chuan et 
al., 2005; Cai, 2004; Cai & Li, 2004a; Cai & Li, 2004b; Deng et al., 2003; Vasiliu, 2011; Wang et 
al., 2005a, 2005b). The main feature of QSDC protocols is that there are no cryptographic 
transformations; thus, there is no key distribution problem in QSDC. In these protocols, a 
secret message is coded by qubits’ (qudits’) – quantum states, which are sent via quantum 
channel. QSDC protocols can be divided into several types:  
• Ping-pong protocol (and its enhanced variants) (Boström & Felbinger, 2002; Cai & Li, 2004b; 
Chamoli & Bhandari, 2009; Gao et al., 2008; Ostermeyer & Walenta, 2008;Vasiliu & 
Nikolaenko, 2009; Vasiliu, 2011).  
• Protocols using block transfer of entangled qubits (Deng et al., 2003; Chuan et al., 2005; Gao 
et al., 2005; Li et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2008; Xiu et al., 2009; Wang et al., 2005a, 2005b). 
• Protocols using single qubits (Cai, 2004; Cai & Li, 2004a). 
• Protocols using entangled qudits (Wang et al., 2005b; Vasiliu, 2011).  
There are QSDC protocols for two parties and for multi-parties, e.g. broadcasting or when 
one user sends message to another under the control of a trusted third party. 
Most contemporary protocols require a transfer of qubits by blocks (Chuan et al., 2005; 
Wang et al., 2005). This allows eavesdropping to be detected in the quantum channel 
before transfer of information. Thus, transfer will be terminated and Eve will not obtain 
any secret information. But for storing such blocks of qubits there is a need for a large 
amount of quantum memory. The technology of quantum memory is actively being 
developed, but it is still far from usage in common standard telecommunication 
equipment. So from the viewpoint of technical realisation, protocols using single qubits or 
their non-large groups (for one cycle of protocol) have an advantage. There are few such 
protocols and they have only asymptotic security, i.e. the attack will be detected with high 
probability, but Eve can obtain some part of information before detection. Thus, the 
problem of privacy amplification appears. In other words, new pre-processing methods of 
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transferring information are needed. Such methods should make intercepted information 
negligible. 
One of the quantum secure direct communication protocols is the ping-pong protocol 
(Boström & Felbinger, 2002; Cai & Li, 2004b; Vasiliu, 2011), which does not require qubit 
transfer by blocks. In the first variant of this protocol, entangled pairs of qubits and two 
coding operations that allow the transmission of one bit of classical information for one 
cycle of the protocol are used (Boström & Felbinger, 2002). The usage of quantum 
superdense coding allows transmitting two bits for a cycle (Cai & Li, 2004b). The subsequent 
increase in the informational capacity of the protocol is possible by the usage instead of 
entangled pairs of qubits their triplets, quadruplets etc. in Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger 
(GHZ) states (Vasiliu & Nikolaenko, 2009). The informational capacity of the ping-pong 
protocol with GHZ-states is equal to n bits on a cycle where n is the number of entangled 
qubits. Another way of increasing the informational capacity of ping-pong protocol is using 
entangled states of qudits. Thus, the corresponding protocol based on Bell’s states of three-
level quantum system (qutrit) pairs and superdense coding for qutrits is introduced (Wang 
et al., 2005; Vasiliu, 2011). 
The advantages of QSDC protocols are a lack of secret key distribution, the possibility of 
data transfer between more than two parties, and the possibility of attack detection 
providing a high level of information security (up to information-theoretic security) for the 
protocols using block transfer. The main disadvantages are difficulty in practical realisation 
of protocols using entangled states (and especially protocols using entangled states for d-
level quantum systems), slow transfer rate, the need for large capacity quantum memory for 
all parties (for protocols using block transfer of qubits), and the asymptotic security of the 
ping-pong protocol. Besides, QSDC protocols similarly to QKD protocols is vulnerable to 
man-in-the-middle attack, although such attack can be neutralized by using authentication 
of all messages, which are sent via the classical channel. 
Asymptotic security of the ping-pong protocol (which is one of the simplest QSDC protocols 
from the technical viewpoint) can be amplified by using methods of classical cryptography. 
Security of several types of ping-pong protocols using qubits and qutrits against different 
attacks was investigated in series of papers (Boström & Felbinger, 2002; Cai, 2004; Vasiliu, 
2011; Vasiliu & Nikolaenko, 2009; Zhang et al., 2005a).  
The security of the ping-pong protocol using qubits against eavesdropping attack using 
ancilla states is investigated in (Boström & Felbinger, 2002; Chuan et al., 2005; Vasiliu & 
Nikolaenko, 2009).  
Eve's information at attack with usage of auxiliary quantum systems (probes) on the ping-
pong protocol with entangled n-qubit GHZ-states is defined by von Neumann entropy 
(Boström & Felbinger, 2002): 
 ( ) { }0 2 2log logi i
i
I S Trρ ρ ρ λ λ= ≡ − = −  (1) 
where iλ  are the density matrix eigenvalues for the composite quantum system 
“transmitted qubits - Eve's probe”. 
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For the protocol with Bell pairs and quantum superdence coding the density matrix ρ  have 
size 4х4 and four nonzero eigenvalues: 
( ) ( ) ( )21,2 1 2 1 2 1 21 1 16 1 ,
2 2
p p p p p p d dλ = + ± + − −
( ) ( ) ( )23,4 3 4 3 4 3 41 1 16 1 .
2 2
p p p p p p d dλ = + ± + − −
 
(2)
For the protocol with GHZ-triplets a density matrix size is 16х16, and а number of nonzero 
eigenvalues is equal to eight. At symmetrical attack their kind is (Vasiliu & Nikolaenko, 2009): 
( ) ( )21,2 1 2 1 2 1 21 1 2 216 1 ,
2 2 3 3
p p p p p p d dλ  = + ± + − ⋅ −  
( ) ( )27,8 7 8 7 8 7 81 1 2 216 1 .
2 2 3 3
p p p p p p d dλ  = + ± + − ⋅ −    
(3)
For the protocol with n-qubit GHZ-states, the number of nonzero eigenvalues of density 
matrix is equal to 2n , and their kind at symmetrical attack is (Vasiliu & Nikolaenko, 2009): 
( ) ( )
2 2
2
1,2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
1 1 2 2
16 1 ,
2 2 2 1 2 1
n n
n n
p p p p p p d dλ
− −
− −
 
= + ± + − ⋅ −  
− − 
( ) ( ) 2 22 1 12 1,2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 21 1 2 216 1 ,2 2 2 1 2 1n n n n n n n n
n n
n n
p p p p p p d dλ
− −
− −− − − −
 
= + ± + − ⋅ −  
− − 
 
(4)
where d is probability of attack detection by legitimate users at one-time switching to control 
mode; ip  are frequencies of n-grams in the transmitted message. 
The probability of that Eve will not be detected after m successful attacks and will gain 
information 0I mI=  is defined by the equation (Boström & Felbinger, 2002): 
 ( ) ( )
0
1
, , ,
1 1
I I
q
s I q d
q d
 
−
=   
− −   (5) 
where q is a probability of switching to control mode. 
In fig. 2 dependences of ( ), ,s I q d  for several n, identical frequencies 2 nip −= , q = 0.5 and 
maxd d=  are shown (Vasiliu & Nikolaenko, 2009). maxd  is maximum probability of attack 
detection at one-time run of control mode, defined as 
 max 1
1
1 .
2n
d
−
= −  (6) 
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At maxd d=  Eve gains the complete information about transmitted bits of the message. It is 
obvious from fig. 2 that the ping-pong protocol with many-qubit GHZ-states is 
asymptotically secure at any number n of qubits that are in entangled GHZ-states. A similar 
result for the ping-pong protocol using qutrit pairs is presented (Vasiliu, 2011). 
A non-quantum method of security amplification for the ping-pong protocol is suggested in 
(Vasiliu & Nikolaenko, 2009; Korchenko et al., 2010c). Such method has been developed on 
the basis of a method of privacy amplification which is utilized in quantum key distribution 
protocols. In case of the ping-pong protocol this method can be some kind of analogy of the 
Hill cipher (Overbey et al., 2005). 
Before the transmission Alice divides the binary message on l blocks of some fixed length r, 
we will designate these blocks as ia  
(i=1,…l). Then Alice generates for each block separately 
random invertible binary matrix iK  of size r r×  and multiplies these matrices by 
appropriate blocks of the message (multiplication is performed by modulo 2): 
 .i i ib K a=  (7) 
 
Fig. 2. Composite probability of attack non-detection s for the ping-pong protocol with 
many-qubit GHZ-states: n=2, original protocol (1); n=2, with superdense coding (2); n=3 (3); 
n=5 (4); n=10 (5); n=16 (6). I is Eve’s information. 
Blocks ib  are transmitted on the quantum channel with the use of the ping-pong protocol. 
Even if Eve, remained undetected, manages to intercept one (or more) from these blocks and 
without knowledge of used matrices iK  Eve won’t be able to reconstruct source blocks ia . 
To reach a sufficient security level the block length r and accordingly the size of matrices iK  
should be selected so that Eve’s undetection probability s after transmission of one block 
would be insignificant small. Matrices iK  are transmitted to Bob via usual (non-quantum) 
open authentic channel after the end of quantum transmission but only in the event when 
Alice and Bob were convinced lack of eavesdropping. Then Bob inverses the received 
matrices and having multiplied them on appropriate blocks ib  he gains an original message. 
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Let's mark that described procedure is not message enciphering, and can be named inverse 
hashing or hashing using two-way hash function, which role random invertible binary 
matrix acts.  
It is necessary for each block to use individual matrix iK  which will allow to prevent 
cryptoanalytic attacks, similar to attacks to the Hill cipher, which are possible there at a 
multiple usage of one matrix for enciphering of several blocks (Eve could perform similar 
attack if she was able before a detection of her operations in the quantum channel to 
intercept several blocks, that are hashing with the same matrix). As matrices in this case are 
not a key and they can be transmitted on the open classical channel, the transmission of the 
necessary number of matrices is not a problem. 
Necessary length r of blocks for hashing and accordingly necessary size r r×  of hashing 
matrices should correspond to a requirement r > I, where І is the information which is 
gained by Eve. Thus, it is necessary for determination of r to calculate І at the given values 
of n, s, q and maxd d= . 
Let's accept ( ), , 10 ks I q d −= , then: 
 0 .
1
lg
1 (1 )
kI
I
q
q d
−
=  
− 
− − 
 (8) 
The calculated values of І are shown in tab. 1: 
 
n q = 0,5; maxd d=  q = 0,5; max 2d d=  q = 0,25; maxd d=  q = 0,25; max 2d d=  
2 69 113 180 313 
3 74 122 186 330 
4 88 145 216 387 
5 105 173 254 458 
6 123 204 297 537 
7 142 236 341 620 
8 161 268 387 706 
9 180 302 434 793 
10 200 335 481 881 
11 220 369 529 970 
12 240 403 577 1059 
13 260 437 625 1149 
14 279 471 673 1238 
15 299 505 721 1328 
16 319 539 769 1417 
17 339 573 817 1507 
18 359 607 865 1597 
19 379 641 913 1686 
20 399 675 961 1776 
Table 1. Eve’s information I at attack on the ping - pong protocol with n-qubit GHZ-states at 
610s −=  (bit). 
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Thus, after transfer of hashed block, the lengths of which are presented in tab. 1, the 
probability of attack non-detection will be equal to 10-6; there is thus a very high probability 
that this attack will be detected. The main disadvantage of the ping-pong protocol, namely 
its asymptotic security against eavesdropping attack using ancilla states, is therefore 
removed.  
There are some others attacks on the ping-pong protocol, e.g. attack which can be performed 
when the protocol is executed in quantum channel with noise (Zhang, 2005a) or Trojan 
horse attack (Gisin et al., 2002). But there are some counteraction methods to these attacks 
(Boström & Felbinger, 2008). Thus, we can say that the ping-pong protocol (the security of 
which is amplified using method described above) is the most prospective QSDC protocol 
from the viewpoint of the existing development level of the quantum technology of 
information processing. 
2.3 Quantum steganography 
Quantum steganography aims to hide the fact of information transferral similar to classical 
steganography. Most current models of quantum steganography systems use entangled 
states. For example, modified methods of entangled photon pair detection are used to hide 
the fact of information transfer in patent (Conti et al., 2004).  
A simple quantum steganographic protocol (stegoprotocol) with using four qubit entangled 
Bell states: 
( )1 2 1 21 0 0 1 12φ+ = + , ( )1 2 1 2
1
0 0 1 1
2
φ− = − , 
( )1 2 1 21 0 1 1 02ψ + = + , ( )1 2 1 2
1
0 1 1 0
2
ψ − = − , 
(9)
was proposed (Terhal et al., 2005). In this protocol n Bell states, including all four states (9) 
with equal probability is divided between two legitimate users (Alice and Bob) by third part 
(Trent). For all states the first qubit is sent to Alice and second to Bob. The secret bit is coded 
in the number of m singlet states ψ −  in the sequence of n states: even m represents “0” and 
odd represents “1”. Alice and Bob perform local measurements each on own qubits and 
calculate the number of singlet states ψ − . That’s why in this protocol Trent can secretly 
transmit information to Alice and Bob simultaneously.  
Shaw & Brun proposed another one quantum stegoprotocol (Shaw & Brun, 2010). In this 
protocol the information qubit is hidden inside the error-correcting code. Thus, for intruder 
the qubits transmission via quantum channel looks like a normal quantum information 
transmission in the noise channel. For information qubit detection the receiver (Bob) must 
have a shared secret key with sender (Alice), which must be distributed before stegoprotocol 
starting. In the fig.3 the scheme of protocol proposed by Shaw & Brun is shown. Alice hides 
information qubit changing its places with qubit in her quantum codeword. She uses her 
secret key to determine which qubit in codeword must be replaced. Next, Alice uses key 
again to twirl (rotate) information qubit. This means that Alice uses one of the four single 
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qubit operators (Pauli operators) І, xσ , yσ  or zσ  for this qubit by determining a concrete 
operation using two current key bits. 
For the intruder who hasn’t a key, this qubit likes qubit in maximal mixed state (the rotation 
can be interpreted as quantum Vernam cipher). In the next stage Alice uses random 
depolarization mistakes (using the same Pauli operators xσ , yσ  or zσ ) to some part of 
others qubits of codeword for simulating some level of noise in quantum channel. Next, she 
sent a codeword to Bob. For correct untwirl operation Bob use the shared secret key and 
then he uses a key again to find information qubit. 
The security of this protocol depends on the security of previous key distribution procedure. 
When key distribution has information-theoretic security, and using information qubit twirl 
(equivalent to quantum Vernam cipher) all scheme can have information-theoretic security. 
It is known the information-theoretic security is provided by QKD protocols. But if an 
intruder continuously monitors the channel for a long time and he has a precise channel 
characteristics, in the final he discovers that Alice transmits information to Bob on quantum 
stegoprotocol. In addition, using quantum measurements of transmitted qubit states, an 
intruder can cancel information transmitting (Denial of Service attack). 
Thus, in the present three basis methods of quantum steganography are proposed: 
1. Hiding in the quantum noise; 
2. Hiding using quantum error-correcting codes; 
3. Hiding in the data formats, protocols etc. 
 
Fig. 3. The scheme of quantum stegoprotocol: С – qubit of codeword, I – information qubit, 
T – twirled information qubit, σ – qubit, to which Alice applies Pauli operator (qubit that 
simulate a noise). 
The last method is the most promising direction of quantum steganography and also hiding 
using quantum error-correcting codes has some prospect in the future practice 
implementation. 
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It should be noted that theoretical research in quantum steganography has not reached the 
level of practical application yet, and it is very difficult to talk about the advantages and 
disadvantages of quantum steganography systems. Whether quantum steganography is 
superior to the classical one or not in practical use is still an open question (Imai & Hayashi, 
2006).  
2.4 Others technologies for quantum secure telecommunication systems 
construction 
Quantum secret sharing (QSS). Most QSS protocols use properties of entangled states. The first 
QSS protocol was proposed by Hillery, Buzek and Berthiaume in 1998 (Hillery et al., 1998; Qin et 
al., 2007). This protocol uses GHZ-triplets (quadruplets) similar to some QSDC protocols. The 
sender shares his message between two (three) parties and only cooperation allows them to 
read this message. Semi-quantum secret sharing protocol using GHZ-triplets (quadruplets) 
was proposed by Li et al. (Li et al., 2009). In this protocol, users that receive a shared message 
have access to the quantum channel. But they are limited by some set of operation and are 
called “classical”, meaning they are not able to prepare entangled states and perform any 
quantum operations or measurements. These users can measure qubits on a “classical” 
{ }0 , 1  basis, reordering the qubits (via proper delay measurements), preparing (fresh) 
qubits in the classical basis, and sending or returning the qubits without disturbance. The 
sending party can perform any quantum operations. This protocol prevails over others QSS 
protocols in economic terms. Its equipment is cheaper because expensive devices for preparing 
and measuring (in GHZ-basis) many-qubit entangled states are not required. Semi-quantum 
secret sharing protocol exists in two variants: randomisation-based and measurement-resend 
protocols. Zhang et al. has been presented QSS using single qubits that are prepared in two 
mutually unbiased bases and transferred by blocks (Zhang et al., 2005b). Similar to the Hillery-
Buzek-Berthiaume protocol, this allows sharing a message between two (or more) parties. The 
security improvement of this protocol against malicious acts of legitimate users is proposed 
(Deng et al., 2005). A similar protocol for multiparty secret sharing also is presented (Yan et al., 
2008). QSS protocols are protected against external attackers and unfair actions of the 
protocol’s parties. Both quantum and semi-quantum schemes allow detecting eavesdropping 
and do not require encryption unlike the classical secret-sharing schemes. The most significant 
imperfection of QSS protocols is the necessity for large quantum memory that is outside the 
capabilities of modern technologies today. 
Quantum stream cipher (QSC) provides data encryption similar to classical stream cipher, but 
it uses quantum noise effect (Hirota et al., 2005) and can be used in optical 
telecommunication networks. QSC is based on the Yuen-2000 protocol (Y-00, αη - scheme). 
Information-theoretic security of the Y-00 protocol is ensured by randomisation (based on 
quantum noise) and additional computational schemes (Nair & Yuen, 2007; Yuen, 2001). In a 
number of papers (Corndorf et al., 2005; Hirota & Kurosawa, 2006; Nair & Yuen, 2007) the 
high encryption rate of the Y-00 protocol is demonstrated experimentally, and a security 
analysis on the Yuen-2000 protocol against the fast correlation attack, the typical attack on 
stream ciphers, is presented (Hirota & Kurosawa, 2006). The next advantage is better 
security compared with usual (classical) stream cipher. This is achieved by quantum noise 
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effect and by the impossibility of cloning quantum states (Wooters & Zurek, 1982). The 
complexity of practical implementation is the most important imperfection of QSC (Hirota & 
Kurosawa, 2006). 
Quantum digital signature (QDS) can be implemented on the basis of protocols such as QDS 
protocols using single qubits (Wang et al., 2006) and QDS protocols using entangled states 
(authentic QDS based on quantum GHZ-correlations) (Wen & Liu, 2005). QDS is based on 
use of the quantum one-way function (Gottesman & Chuang, 2001). This function has better 
security than the classical one-way function, and it has information-theoretic security (its 
security does not depend on the power of the attacker’s equipment). Quantum one-way 
function is defined by the following properties of quantum systems (Gottesman & Chuang, 
2001):  
1. Qubits can exist in superposition “0” and “1” unlike classical bits. 
2. We can get only a limited quantity of classical information from quantum states 
according to the Holevo theorem (Holevo, 1977). Calculation and validation are not 
difficult but inverse calculation is impossible.  
In the systems that use QDS, user identification and integrity of information is provided 
similar to classical digital signature (Gottesman & Chuang, 2001). The main advantages of 
QDS protocols are information-theoretic security and simplified key distribution system. 
The main disadvantage is the possibility to generate a limited number of public key copies 
and the leak of some quantities of information about incoming data of quantum one-way 
function (unlike the ideal classical one-way function) (Gottesman & Chuang, 2001). 
Fig. 4 represents a general scheme of the methods of quantum secure telecommunication 
systems construction for their purposes and for using some quantum technologies. 
2.5 Review of commercial quantum secure telecommunication systems 
The world’s first commercial quantum cryptography solution was QPN Security Gateway 
(QPN-8505) (QPN Security Gateway, 2011) proposed by MagiQ Technologies (USA). This 
system (fig. 5 a) is a cost-effective information security solution for governmental and 
financial organisations. It proposes VPN protection using QKD (up to 100 256-bit keys per 
second, up to 140 km) and integrated encryption. The QPN-8505 system uses BB84, 3DES 
(NIST, 1999) and AES (NIST, 2001) protocols.  
The Swiss company Id Quantique (Cerberis, 2011) offers a systems called Clavis2 (fig. 5 b) and 
Cerberis. Clavis2 uses a proprietary auto-compensating optical platform, which features 
outstanding stability and interference contrast, guaranteeing low quantum bit error rate. 
Secure key exchange becomes possible up to 100 km. This optical platform is well 
documented in scientific publications and has been extensively tested and characterized. 
Cerberis is a server with automatic creation and secret key exchange over a fibre channel 
(FC-1G, FC-2G and FC-4G). This system can transmit cryptographic keys up to 50 km and 
carries out 12 parallel cryptographic calculations. The latter substantially improves the 
system’s performance. The Cerberis system uses AES (256-bits) for encryption and BB84 and 
SARG04 protocols for quantum key distribution. Main features:  
• Future-proof security. 
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• Scalability: encryptors can be added when network grows. 
• Versatility: encryptors for different protocols can be mixed. 
• Cost-effectiveness: one quantum key server can distribute keys to several encryptors. 
 
 
M E T H O D S  O F  Q U A N T U M  S E C U R E  T E L E C O M M U N I C A T I O N  S Y S T E M S  
C O N S T R U C T I O N
Q U A N T U M  K E Y  
D I S T R I B U T I O N
Q U A N T U M
S E C U R E  D I R E C T  
C O M M U N I C A T I O N
Q U A N T U M  
D I G I T A L  
S I G N A T U R E
Q U A N T U M  
S T R E A M  
C I P H E R
Q U A N T U M  
S E C R E T  
S H A R I N G
Q U A N T U M  T E C H N O L O G I E S
SINGLE QUBITS TRANSFER
(NON-CLONING THEOREM)
D - L E V E L  Q U A N T U M  
S Y S T E M S  T R A N S F E R
PROPERTIES OF QUANTUM 
ENTANGLED STATES (QUANTUM 
CORRELATION)
Q
K
D
 u
si
n
g
 s
in
g
le
 
q
u
b
it
s 
an
d
 q
u
d
it
s
Q
K
D
 u
si
n
g
 
en
ta
n
g
le
d
 s
ta
te
s
Y
u
en
 2
0
0
0
 p
ro
to
co
l 
(Y
-0
0
, 
αη
-s
ch
em
e 
)
Q
D
S
 u
si
n
g
 s
in
g
le
 
q
u
b
it
s 
an
d
 q
u
d
it
s
Q
S
D
C
 u
si
n
g
 s
in
g
le
 
q
u
b
it
s
Q
S
D
C
w
it
h
 b
lo
ck
 
tr
an
sf
er
P
in
g
-p
o
n
g
 p
ro
to
co
l
Q
S
S
 u
si
n
g
 s
in
g
le
 
q
u
b
it
s
Q
S
S
 u
si
n
g
 
en
ta
n
g
le
d
 s
ta
te
s
ВВ
8
4
, 
В9
2
, 
D
ec
o
y 
st
a
te
s 
p
ro
to
co
ls
, 
S
ix
-s
ta
te
s 
p
ro
to
co
l
,
4
+
2
p
ro
to
co
l,
 
G
o
ld
en
b
er
g
-V
a
id
m
a
n
 p
ro
to
co
l,
 
K
o
a
sh
i-
Im
o
to
 p
ro
to
co
l
ВВ
8
4
p
ro
to
co
l 
a
n
d
S
ix
-s
ta
te
s 
p
ro
to
co
l 
fo
r 
d
-l
ev
el
 q
u
a
n
tu
m
 
sy
st
em
s
E
ke
rt
 p
ro
to
co
l 
(Е9
1
)
E
n
ta
n
g
le
d
 s
ta
te
s 
p
ro
to
co
ls
fo
r 
d
-l
ev
el
 q
u
a
n
tu
m
 s
ys
te
m
s
P
in
g
-p
o
n
g
p
ro
to
co
l 
w
it
h
 q
u
b
it
s
P
in
g
-p
o
n
g
p
ro
to
co
ls
 w
it
h
 d
-l
ev
el
 q
u
a
n
tu
m
 
sy
st
em
s
Q
D
S
 u
si
n
g
 
en
ta
n
g
le
d
 s
ta
te
s
 
 
Fig. 4. Methods of quantum secure telecommunication systems construction. 
Toshiba Research Europe Ltd (Great Britain) recently presented another QKD system named 
Quantum Key Server (QKS, 2011). This system (fig. 5 c) delivers digital keys for cryptographic 
applications on fibre optic based computer networks. Based on quantum cryptography it 
provides a failsafe method of distributing verifiably secret digital keys, with significant cost 
and key management advantages. The system provides world-leading performance. In 
particular, it allows key distribution over standard telecom fibre links exceeding 100 km in 
length and bit rates sufficient to generate 1 Megabit per second of key material over a 
distance of 50 km — sufficiently long for metropolitan coverage. Toshiba's system uses a 
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simple “one-way” architecture, in which the photons travel from sender to receiver. This 
design has been rigorously proven as secure from most types of eavesdropping attack. 
Toshiba has pioneered active stabilisation technology that allows the system to distribute 
key material continuously, even in the most challenging operating conditions, without any 
user intervention. This avoids the need for recalibration of the system due to temperature-
induced changes in the fibre lengths. Initiation of the system is also managed automatically, 
allowing simple turn-key operation. It has been shown to work successfully in several 
network field trials. The system can be used for a wide range of cryptographic applications, 
e.g., encryption or authentication of sensitive documents, messages or transactions. A 
programming interface gives the user access to the key material. 
 
 
a) b) c) 
Fig. 5. Some commercial quantum secure telecommunication systems. 
Another British company, QinetiQ, realised the world’s first network using quantum 
cryptography—Quantum Net (Qnet) (Elliot et al., 2003; Hughes et al., 2002). The maximum 
length of telecommunication lines in this network is 120 km. Moreover, it is a very 
important fact that Qnet is the first QKD system using more than two servers. This system 
has six servers integrated to the Internet. 
In addition the world’s leading scientists are actively taking part in the implementation of 
projects such as SECOQC (Secure Communication based on Quantum Cryptography) (SECOQC 
White Paper on Quantum Key Distribution and Cryptography, 2007), EQCSPOT (European 
Quantum Cryptography and Single Photon Technologies) (Alekseev & Korneyko, 2007) and 
SwissQuantum (Swissquantum, 2011).  
SECOQC is a project that aims to develop quantum cryptography network. The European 
Union decided in 2004 to invest € 11 million in the project as a way of circumventing 
espionage attempts by ECHELON (global intelligence gathering system, USA). This project 
combines people and organizations in Austria, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Canada, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden and Switzerland. On 
October 8, 2008 SECOQC was launched in Vienna.  
Following no-cloning theorem, QKD only can provide point-to-point (sometimes called 
“1:1”) connection. So the number of links will increase ( 1) / 2N N −  as N represents the 
number of nodes. If a node wants to participate into the QKD network, it will cause some 
issues like constructing quantum communication line. To overcome these issues, SECOQC 
was started. SECOQC network architecture (fig. 6) can by divided by two parts. Trusted 
private network and quantum network consisted with QBBs (Quantum Back Bone). Private 
network is conventional network with end-nodes and a QBB. QBB provides quantum 
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channel communication between QBBs. QBB is consisted with a number of QKD devices 
that are connected with other QKD devices in 1:1 connection. From this, SECOQC can 
provide easier registration of new end-node in QKD network, and quick recovery from 
threatening on quantum channel links. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Brief network architecture of SECOQC. 
We also note that during the project SECOQC the seven most important QKD systems have 
been developed or refined (Kollmitzer & Pivk, 2010). Among these QKD systems are Clavis2 
and Quantum Key Server described above and also:  
1. The coherent one-way system (time-coding) designed by GAP-Universite de Geneve and 
idQuantique realizes the novel distributed-phase-reference coherent one-way 
protocol. 
2. The entanglement-based QKD system developed by an Austrian–Swedish consortium. The 
system uses the unique quantum mechanical property of entanglement for transferring 
the correlated measurements into a secret key.  
3. The free-space QKD system developed by the group of H. Weinfurter from the University 
of Munich. It employs the BB84 protocol using polarization encoded attenuated laser 
pulses with photons of 850 nm wavelength. Decoy states are used to ensure key security 
even with faint pulses. The system is applicable to day and night operation using 
excessive filtering in order to suppress background light.  
4. The low-cost QKD system was developed by John Rarity’s team of the University of 
Bristol. The system can be applied for secure banking including consumer protection. 
The design philosophy is based on a future hand-held electronic credit card using 
free-space optics. A method is proposed to protect these transactions using the shared 
secret stored in a personal hand-held transmitter. Thereby Alice’s module is 
integrated within a small device such as a mobile telephone, or personal digital 
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assistant, and Bob’s module consists of a fixed device such as a bank asynchrone 
transfer mode. 
The primary objective of EQCSPOT project is bringing quantum cryptography to the point 
of industrial application. Two secondary objectives exist to improve single photon 
technologies for wider applications in metrology, semiconductor characterisation, 
biosensing etc and to assess the practical use of future technologies for general quantum 
processors. The primary results will be in the tangible improvements in key distribution. 
The overall programme will be co-ordinated by British Defence Evaluation and Research 
Agency and the work will be divided into eight workparts with each workpart co-ordinated 
by one organisation. Three major workparts are dedicated to the development of the three 
main systems: NIR fibre, 1.3-1.55 µm fibre and free space key exchange. The other five are 
dedicated to networks, components and subsystems, software development, spin-off 
technologies and dissemination of results. 
One of the key specificities of the SwissQuantum project is to aim at long-term 
demonstration of QKD and its applications. Although this is not the first quantum network 
to be deployed, it wills the first one to operate for months with real traffic. In this sense, the 
SwissQuantum network presents a major impetus for the QKD technology.  
The SwissQuantum network consists of three layers: 
• Quantum Layer. This layer performs Quantum Key Exchange. 
• Key Management Layer. This layer manages the quantum keys in key servers and 
provides secure key storage, as well as advanced functions (key transfer and routing). 
• Application Layer. In this layer, various cryptographic services use the keys distributed 
to provide secure communications. 
There are many practical and theoretical research projects concerning the development of 
quantum technology in research institutes, laboratories and centres such as Institute for 
Quantum Optics and Quantum Information, Northwestern University, SmartQuantum, 
BBN Technologies of Cambridge, TREL, NEC, Mitsubishi Electric, ARS Seibersdorf Research 
and Los Alamos National Laboratory.  
3. Conclusion 
This chapter presents a classification and systematisation of modern quantum technology of 
information security. The characteristic of the basic directions of quantum cryptography 
from the point of view of the quantum technologies used is given. A qualitative analysis of 
the advantages and imperfections of concrete quantum protocols is made. Today the most 
developed direction of quantum secure telecommunication systems is QKD protocols. In 
research institutes, laboratories and centres, quantum cryptographic systems for secret key 
distribution for distant legitimate users are being developed. Most of the technologies used 
in these systems are patented in different countries (mainly in the U.S.A.). Such QKD 
systems can be combined with any classical cryptographic scheme, which provides 
information-theoretic security, and the entire cryptographic scheme will have information-
theoretic security also. QKD protocols can generally provide higher information security 
level than appropriate classical schemes. 
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Other secure quantum technologies in practice have not been extended beyond laboratory 
experiments yet. But there are many theoretical cryptographic schemes that provide high 
information security level up to the information-theoretic security. QSDC protocols remove 
the secret key distribution problem because they do not use encryption. One of these is the 
ping-pong protocol and its improved versions. These protocols can provide high 
information security level of confidential data transmission using the existing level of 
technology with security amplification methods. Another category of QSDC is protocols 
with transfer qubits by blocks that have unconditional security, but these need a large 
quantum memory which is out of the capabilities of modern technologies today. It must be 
noticed that QSDC protocols are not suitable for the transfer of a high-speed flow of 
confidential data because there is low data transfer rate in the quantum channel. But when a 
high information security level is more important than transfer rate, QSDC protocols should 
find its application. 
Quantum secret sharing protocols allow detecting eavesdropping and do not require data 
encryption. This is their main advantage over classical secret sharing schemes. Similarly, 
quantum stream cipher and quantum digital signature provide higher security level than 
classical schemes. Quantum digital signature has information-theoretic security because it 
uses quantum one-way function. However, practical implementation of these quantum 
technologies is also faced to some technological difficulties. 
Thus, in recent years quantum technologies are rapidly developing and gradually taking 
their place among other means of information security. Their advantage is a high level of 
security and some properties, which classical means of information security do not have. 
One of these properties is the ability always to detect eavesdropping. Quantum 
technologies therefore represent an important step towards improving the security of 
telecommunication systems against cyber-terrorist attacks. But many theoretical and 
practical problems must be solved for wide practical use of quantum secure 
telecommunication systems. 
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